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by SIDNEY HOOK

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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

FROM EXPERIENCE TO NATURE [1]

METAPHYSICS, the attempt at an analysis of the ultimate nature of being, is perhaps the most sophisticated of philosophical enterprises. Human thought and imagination have many problems to solve before they explore so ultimate and esoteric an inquiry. Yet human thinking moves early to frame some version of a steady and encompassing system by which all objects and events move and have their being. Moment to moment experience may be fragmentary and isolated and meaningless, roughly and loosely bound together by memory and expectation, but the imagination of man must very early have moved toward some notion of a total order, some conception of regularity or comprehensive network of relations between things and between events. Very early in the history of the race some tentative attempt must have been made to infer a cosmos out of the empirical chaos, to imagine or to believe in a comprehensive cosmic system, a system of nature.

If one were to seek the psychological and social origin of such thinking toward a system of nature or belief in it, one would find it in the objective regularities which man finds in his environment. There are the cycles of the seasons, the curve of life from birth to death, the behavior and reproduction of animals each after their own kind. There are also the social regularities and tribal traditions—in primitive life the *mores* of the group seem far more fixed and dreadful than we in a changing civilization can vividly imagine. There are again the internal regularities of one's own body and mind, repeated needs and fulfillments, vitalities and depressions.

If man lived like an animal from moment to moment with no memory and no anticipation, experience would be simply a succession of flashes, irregular, unpredictable, and unrelated, such as events must be in the consciousness of a dog or a baby. Hunger and thirst would assail, lust would arouse, fatigue would overcome the human animal. Its pains and frustrations and fulfillments would have no order or connection; they would be like the flashes of sunlight through the leaves of a forest, or the sound of music rising and falling unheeded at a distance. But the perception of regulari-

[1] Read at the meeting of the New York Philosophical Club, November 18, 1927.

ties in the outer world, in the inner consciousness, in the world of man, leads the human imagination to connect events into an order, to attribute them to some agency, or some principle, to give them a rationale. Even the most capricious and unregulated existence,—primitive existence is in many ways less capricious and unregulated than that of civilized man—reveals enough consistency and connection to instill belief in a total system in nature.

Nature, long before even the word is thought of, is that system to which explicitly or unconsciously all phenomena or events are referred. Nature is not a datum; it is not given like pain or hunger or desire; it is not an immediate experience. It is a highly sophisticated inference from experience. But the most primitive human being, and even animals in so far as their instinctive activities are adapted to the regularities and occurrences, believe in, imply by action, a total natural order.

Now the cosmic order, explicitly believed in or implicitly acted upon, may be of very various kinds. What has with us become commonplace, a conception of a mechanical system, the relations of ultimate physical particles, a materialistic version of nature, is a late development in the history of thought. It could not have occurred early. It requires a detachment, a certainty, and a sophistication not possessed by primitive man, to conceive all objects as constituted and events as determined by the indifferent processes of neutral mechanical relations. The regularities in nature and the total system of nature must have been conceived in the only terms familiar to the primitive imagination, human terms, and since in primitive life the distinction between animals and humans was not very clearly drawn, one might almost say animal terms. It was much more natural and easy for primitive man to attribute all events to humanly motivated agencies than to the impersonal connection of mechanical cause and effect.

There has been considerable debate as to by just what psychological processes primitive man came to attribute to the impersonal relations in nature the personal preferences and aversions of man. According to the theory that generally goes by the name of animism, it was inference by analogy. It is far more likely, in the light of recent inquiry, that it was not inference by analogy at all. It never occurred to primitive man to carry over from human action to natural objects. It seemed rather a matter of immediate experience with the powers in the natural world, wind and rain and sun. Essential animals and plants were simply superhuman forces with quite human motives, with a wider range and higher effectiveness than those of human beings, but motivated equally by love and hate, by preference and aversion. This conception of a magical universe

still lingers in our language and in our thought. The sun to common-sense feeling still rises and sets, the wind howls, the storm rages, the flood threatens; in moments of excitement or simplicity, or fatigue, we relapse easily into this category of friendly and unfriendly powers, this human interpretation of the ultimate forces afoot in the world. Now it is not to be supposed that primitive man had a metaphysics which he called magic or animism. That is, the names were given in retrospect to that habit of mind which regarded or regards objects as produced and events as affected by superhuman powers and humanly understandable intentions. Despite the omnipresence of scientific language and thought and of mechanical invention, the world of imagination is still the world of naïve common sense. In comparison with it the explanation of things in terms of mechanism remains mysterious and unaccountable. The enraged storm, the slinking sun hiding its face, and the insulted rain refusing its fertile benediction, are intelligible to human beings, who have not yet learned to make a distinction between the realm of human passions and intentions and the realm of mechanical facts. That *B* should follow *A* in the absolute but inexplicable relation of cause and effect may remain an ultimate factor of experience, but remains from the point of view of human logic a mystery. So strong is the human conviction in many philosophers that the whole order of nature must be intelligible, that elaborate systems of thought have been devised to find a purpose in that order, to redeem the facts of nature from the science of mechanism for the expressing of some moral or humanly intelligible induction. The demand, it may be said, for such moral intelligibility has been almost identical with the demand for logical intelligibility. For by strictly human canons a natural order that is not in a human and humane sense rational is scarcely rational at all. The quarrel between mechanism and teleology, between the notion that the universe is a system of causes rather than a system of purposes, is not yet over, even in contemporary thought. The relation between human purpose and purposeless mechanism is an issue around which revolve some of the most crucial moral and metaphysical considerations. It involves the validity of theology, and the status of human morality; it is the occasion for pessimism and optimism, religious exaltation or depression, psychological enthusiasm and despair. It is the contemporary version of the ancient quarrel between a system of thought that made the canons of human morality the logic of the universe, and a system of thought that followed the order of causes in nature wherefore it led and demanded no other rationality than the sequence and relations of that order itself.

The primitive as well as the civilized imagination reads into the

conglomerate chaos of events and of things a kind of order and stability. In primitive life this conception of order is not expressively articulate, and it is infected throughout with a kind of pathetic fallacy. An articulate order is a much later achievement and it is an achievement first of the distinctively religious, rather than of the distinctively philosophical mind. Localized powers become localized gods, the gods were gathered into the family, they represented functions or aspects of the whole panorama of experience. The Olympian family is a highly cultivated development of a highly imaginative conception of nature. As Jane Harrison points out in *Themis,* this ultimate Greek religion is simply the dark forest of early Greek religion, cleared, cleansed, purified, humanized, and logicized. The religious tradition becomes the sacrosanct enshrinement of one plausible conception of order in experience, the magical interpretation of things and events in terms of human intentions and relations.

Meanwhile, while the religious tradition of a system of gods arises, gods who are essentially human agents with superhuman powers, the empirical tradition of handicrafts, of dealing with actual and tangible objects, fire and food and sun, builds up a rival tradition of order. The empire of the gods is one thing and that is the business of religion; the empire of things is another, and that is the business of the rule of thumb order, the fund of traditional rules of the practical arts and crafts. In its deeper and noumenal significance nature is conceived as a system of god-like powers; in its practical and ostensible surface, nature is conceived in terms of materials and the resistances and facilities they offer to the handicraftsman. Out of the former grew the theological and moralistic versions of nature; out of the latter the empirical mechanical conception. Philosophy, as Professor Dewey points out in *Reconstruction in Philosophy,* arises as a mediator, a critical liaison officer between these two traditions.

The Rise of the Idea of Nature

The first serious attempt to conceive clearly and completely a total order of nature was among the Greeks. Early Greek philosophy was in some ways a singularly lucid, in some ways a singularly naïve attempt to define or construct a system of totality into which all objects could be set and by which all changes might be explained. For every attempt to conceive a system of nature involves two things: it must account for permanence and it must account for changes. Experience reveals not simply a static order; it exhibits a dynamic and a growth, a passing from one thing to another as well as stable things themselves. Existence is not simply a thing;

it is a process. The universe is not a static order; it is a development. Early Greek philosophy was thus not simply an attempt to find the unity in which all things have their being; it was an attempt to define the principle of generation by which all things had their growth. In the traditional phrase, it aimed to explain not simply Being, but Becoming.

In pre-Socratic thinking we find the characteristic answers that have become classic in the history of philosophy. The very earliest philosophers, Thales, Anaximander, and Empedocles, thought to have arrived at the element, the Stuff, the Material, out of which reality might be said to be made. Thales said it was water, Anaximenes air, and Empedocles earth, air, fire, and water, a quartet given permanent classic recognition by Aristotle. But the material out of which reality is made is in many respects a less significant question than the principle which pervades it, the rationale of its operation. Once some system of nature has been framed, experience ceases to be a vagary, an appearance and disappearance of random objects, and casual events. They become intelligible or at least predictable; within the realm of its order one knows what to do or at least what to expect.

Now once the whole of things is reflected upon, there are two apparently separate and contrary aspects of it to be accounted for. There are permanences, things; there are impermanences, changes among things, the transformation, the passage from one thing to another. It is hard to say which is the more impressive feature of the world about us to the casual or even to the concentrated awareness. To common and poetic observation, nothing is so obvious or so tragic as the impermanence of all things and especially of cherished ones. Ice melts and rivers flow, youth fades, and roses decay. "One can not step into the river twice," remarked Heraclitus, for it is not only the river that changes, but you yourself who change. The senses never reveal twice the same object, nor is it the same observer to whom the changed object is revealed. The flow of things and the flow of consciousness move on immitigably. There is no fixity in what seems to be the outer world; there is no stability in what may be roughly described as the inner world of sensations or thoughts.

Thought itself is a movement, a passage from one term or essence through a sequence of relations to another. So impressive, indeed, is the transiency of the immediate that a good case may be made out for the impossibility of ever arriving at a system of nature at all. In one sense the immediate is ultimate. One may utter the fact of change, but the immediacy of change itself can not be uttered or described; it can only be experienced. There is a certain accurate ab-

dicating wisdom in the mystic who refuses to recognize any reality except in that of the immediate moment, and insists that that immediacy can never be transcended. On the basis of such an insistence, the world becomes telescoped to a moment, and the order of nature is nothing but the pattern of an appearance.

Yet while no two instants reveal the same objects and no two events are exactly the same, experience does reveal stability. No two objects are alike and yet objects are sufficiently similar to be recognizable, that is, to be classifiable, that is, to be placed in categories and in relations. Particular things change, but the experience of particular things is shot through with universals. The façade, so to put it, of empirical appearance is constituted by the vaulting of logical connection and physical structure. The universe is not a brand-new apparition every instant. The furniture of the dream may vary, but we learn to describe recurrent features in the furniture of the dream.

The discovery of permanence in a world of constant change has surprisingly diverse results for the whole development of the idea of a system of nature. Permanences may be recognized simply as logical existences, as they appear to have been by Plato. These logical existences are quite diverse in character from physical perdurances, and they have nothing in common with the physical existence of objects in time. From this identification of the timeless essences involved in any experience of objects in time, the great demarcation may arise between the world of physical existences and the world of logistic ideas. Permanence may come to be assigned to logical universals, essences, forms, or ideas transcendent to the physical things which involve these universals.

Out of this distinction between logical universals and physical particulars arises a conception of a realm of mind and a realm of matter, thought on the one hand, and extension on the other. The relation of this unchanging world of mind to this changing world of things thus gives nature, as it were, two modes, but nature, as in Spinoza, remains a name for the whole of existence, both mental and physical, in the comprehensive principle of its operation.

On the other hand, the permanences discovered may be the permanences, not of logical essences, but of some unchanging quasi-material substance below the changing appearances of things. Permanence becomes not logical eternity, but physical endurance. Things change, but matter is immortal. Things decay, but matter remains forever, itself and the same. The notion that the changing appearances of things are but variations of one single substance early attracted the attention of Greek thinkers. To reduce the many to the One was a feat of Thales, Anaximander, and Anaxi-

menes. All things are made out of one central and ultimate stuff. Parmenides with a clear dialectical insight generalized the problem, whatever the one may be, whatever the many are; they are variations of a single theme.

> The one remains, the many change and pass,
> Heaven's light forever shines, earth's shades fly,
> Life like a dome of many-colored glass,
> Stains the white radiance of eternity.

Complete multiplicity is unthinkable since thinking itself would be paralyzed in a completely miscellaneous universe. Thinkers from the dawn of philosophy have tried to reduce the apparent diverseness of things to a smaller set of elements, ultimately, if possible, to one element, even if that element can only be described as the One.

William James speculates in his *Pragmatism* about why the number "one" should have such fascination for thinkers and for the layman. Why, he says, not 2,000,243,000? The answer is not difficult. Oneness simplifies the universe and makes it possible to sum it up at once and put everything in it into a neat and clear compactness. But while it is easy enough to say all is one, as Zeno is said to have done, or to insist that the One alone is real and that the many are simply elusive variations upon a single real being, it becomes a real dialectical difficulty, and a difficulty in physics, to account for the apparent diversity; the leap from unity to plurality is enormous and difficult. Mechanism as stated first by Democritus and taken over some centuries later by Lucretius and Epicurus is a radical and final solution. It placed between the chaotic plurality of appearances certain similar irreducible elements, and these constitute, as it were, the ultimate irreducibles of nature, the Real of which all other things are permutations and combinations. These Reals are, in the type of materialism such as that of Democritus, ultimate physical particles, whose permutations and combinations are explained in terms of general laws and regularities, vital but purposeless relations, laws of nature. These are laws in the sense of always obtaining in experience. It matters not how involved a mechanistic explanation becomes, it may be reduced ultimately to ultimate particles in regularly recurring variations.

Mechanism thus accounts for permanence; whether it be a similar insistence upon a definite number of ultimate particles or a complex statement of the conservation of matter or energy, permanence resides not in the diverse appearance of things, but in the elements into which they may be analytically resolved or the principles by which they are constituted.

Changes are not random or capricious. They are the expressions

of regular and predictable relations; for the shifting and dubious realm of appearances is substituted the permanent and intelligible realm of matter, of some substance in some sort in motion. The feat of translating the miscellany of the world, the miscellany of appearance into the clear order of mechanism, dialectical in its clarity, incredible in its existence, is a magnificient piece of rationalization of experience. Permanence and change, both undeniably features of experience, are accounted for, a realm of nature is established in which all events have their nexus and all objects find their status.

In one form or another the simple logical ideal of ultimate elements in mechanical motion has been restated by modern science. The details have become highly complex, but the form remains in essentials the same. It has captivated the modern imagination, it has made the world intelligible, it has grown increasingly influential in controlling the physical environment, and in the service of the interests of human beings.

When most educated moderns, therefore, speak of nature, they mean by it that scheme of matter in motion which was first enunciated by Democritus among the Greeks. But the theory of mechanical nature leaves as many problems as it solves. Very early in the history of thought some of these difficulties were recognized, and few of them have yet been clarified.

While mechanism may account for objects and those changes among objects which we call events, it does not explain either the origin or the ultimate essence of the elements of which objects are composed, and it fails totally to explain what by definition can not be explained in mechanical terms, namely, purpose and value. A mechanical order is by definition blind and purposeless and valueless, yet in the world of common experience there is preference and aversion, foresight and deliberation. In modern biological science there has been an attempt to break through the realm of mechanism in so far as biological behavior is concerned, but if mechanism is a theory that accounts for the whole of nature, it must account for animal and human nature, too.

But a mechanical system of nature or any system of nature raises a further problem. Not only is nature constructed by leaving out a good deal that passes for real in experience, but nature, since it is clearly an intellectual construction and achievement of the synthesizing imagination, renders acute the distinction between appearance and reality. The "world of appearances" goes and events may be merely illusory. They may be simply the expression of ultimate elements of matter in motion. They may be the operation of Divinity or biological in action, but material elements and the laws of motion, the process of God or of dialectic, are themselves syntheses

constructed by human beings out of their scattered experience of appearances. From the point of view of first-hand experience, nothing could be less real and more ghostly than the world of molecules in motion, centers of energy or force which science reveals for our belief. Nature, as the mechanist conceives it, seems, indeed, to be simply an elaborate intellectual structure invented for convenience by the troubled human animal living in a precarious changing world.

Retreat from Nature

It is easy to see how the speculative mind might suddenly come to the conclusion that nature itself, however encompassing and fundamental a reality it may seem to be, is itself simply a soliloquy, an ordered dream by which and in which all things are given a status and accounted for. Nature in terms of which we want to explain the appearance of mind is itself a speculative conception, a fruit of the appearance of mind. Schopenhauer noted with triumphant irony that materialism and mechanism, when they come to explain "mind," are "seized suddenly with ultimate laughter." If you agree with Schopenhauer, nature presupposes a mind which projects a scheme of mechanism. The world implies a self which conceives the idea of a world.

There is obviously some confusion here between the structure of nature and the structure of thought or description of nature. The history of the formation of the idea of nature in the individual and the history of the formation of nature itself are not the same things. The report upon the nature of things is confused with the nature itself.

But if one starts with the fact of some kind of Self or Consciousness from the standpoint of that Self, or Consciousness, the world is truly a dream. It is a dream either in the sense of a happily steadied vision such as Berkeley in essence conceived it to be or it is a dream in the sense of a romantic fiction, spun by the soliloquizing mind, such a world as Fichte and Schilling conceived. The fiction has a certain order, but it is an order imposed by the conditions of vision or the conditions of that fictive creation which is a romantic version of mind. Nature has a rationale, but it is a rationale of the mind's own imposition or structure or dictation. The categories of consciousness, the principle of sufficient reason, the nature of the Self and the mind determine *a priori* comprehensively the nature of things which has a status only in relation to the mind which beholds or creates it.

Or, again, nature may be conceived as a phantasy inferred from this scattered series of impressions which are the individual soul's ultimate materials. Solipsism may be the conception of a private

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vision, of a private creation, of an isolated and hermit self. There is from the standpoint of poetic apprehension good reason why appearances to us should be regarded only as appearances and for us only. Philosophers have often been poets even when their language was prose, and there is a whole romantic German tradition which has built a metaphysics as a poet might build a world on the basis of the surfaces of experience, but found amiable, and the logic of congruity with his desires. Metaphysics to such philosophers is a poet's privilege and irrefutable. The statement that a universe is nothing if not his own is lyrical in its madness and methodical in its delusion.

One may adopt the standpoint of transcendental soliloquy or solipsistic vision as a poetic posture, but transcendentalism and solipsism are the most unstable and precarious of philosophies, for as Hume pointed out long ago, the self is as dubious as the environing world and critics have corrected Descartes and pointed out that one can even doubt that one is doubting.

The appeal of transcendental and solipsistic philosophy is widespread and intelligible. It is releasing to believe that consciousness determines the substance of its cosmic vision or that the history of the universe is whatever story consciousness chooses to tell itself. All this is egotism in the grand manner. Solipsism does not guarantee the persuasive or beautiful character of these appearances whose appearing to the solipsist constitutes their whole being, but solipsism does rob them at least of any independence or ultimacy. Transcendentalism is even more persuasive. The world ceases to be an obdurate fact and becomes a free fiction. The logic of history is not the nexus of independent causes and consequences, but the internal cogency of an inner dream, and a willful fiction; creation becomes a psychological lyric, not a cosmological epic. Solipsism and transcendentalism have therefore been escapes from the pressure of the logic of fact to the suasion of the logic of phantasy. Nature on a solipsistic or transcendental basis is a retreat from experience, or rather a retreat into the confines of one kind of experience, the experience of the dialectical imagination, but it is a retreat which can not be indulged in too long.

Escape from Solipsism

There are a dozen reasons why solipsism and transcendentalism have not long held the attention of serious philosophers, for thought must have a subject-matter and must begin with what is actually there. To identify discourse about a world with that world itself is an error which experience will soon correct. The lineaments of discourse, the grammar of our logic, are determined by the not too

gentle suasion of objects and events. It is not philosophical proof, but biological compulsion that re-establishes nature as independent of a private vision of it or a private fiction about it, and displays those private visions and fictions as in themselves events and emergences in nature. The presence of objects that fulfill and frustrate, of other minds and wills that further or deny our own, are introductions to a common and communal realm of experience. It is out of the needs and compulsions of our animal bodies and the reassurances of other conniving and unanimous minds that we begin to frame some systematic version of nature. To assume that, hemmed in as we are by recurrent desires and their steady modes of fulfillment, we have invented the whole of nature as a kind of *divertissement,* is a monstrous assumption. It is as if to think that the bark had invented the dog, or the child to insist it had created the moon that it beholds. Mind occurs as a complication in nature. To assume that nature occurs as a kind of phosphoresence of mind is a curious piece of metaphysical egotism. Spinoza was wiser when he said the order of ideas and the order of things were one.

From Nature to Metaphysics

None the less, the speculative mind is not content to accept the common and serviceable order of nature as ultimate. To the harassed animal obsessed with fixed interests and needs, it is necessary thus pragmatically to conceive of the world as a given systematic structure, the practical and provisional world which can be rendered transparently and coherently in that ordered and responsible discourse we call rational thought. For it is quite clear to the metaphysical inquirer that nature, however its elements and relations be defined, is only one of many possible worlds. The poet might dream, the logicizing mind might ponder a thousand worlds whose whole constitutional arrangements were totally different from those in which we live and by whose compulsions we are controlled. A differently organized body with different interests and needs would have framed a totally different version of cosmic order. A differently ordered cosmos would radically have altered the organization of that animal life out of which and in whose interest thought emerges. Nature is an order of actuality which must be lived in and which may be explored and which comes to be translated into a useful and relevent structure of discourse, but the realm of the actual does not exhaust the regions of the possible. The metaphysical imagination reaches, at least speculatively, to ponder all possible existence, proceeds to resolve nature, not into constituent physical elements and relations, but into those constitutive logical relations which this so-called coercive world or any world whatsoever would

have to exhibit. Actuality and possibility, form and matter, cause and effect, time and eternity, appearance and reality, are distinctions which any conceivable realm of being would have to exemplify. The metaphysician seeks to explore not only the constitution that nature happens to have, but what any system of nature would have to be to be at all.

IRWIN EDMAN.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

THE TWENTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

THE year 1926 having been philosophically distinguished by a highly successful Congress of many nations it might have been expected than any purely American enterprise of the same order in the following year could not but appear meagre and mediocre by contrast. It was indeed partly by virtue of a happy concurrence of circumstances that the gathering of philosophers in the closing days of 1927 managed to achieve its effect of magnitude and importance.

In the first place, by original intention there was no ordinary call merely to the Atlantic coast division of the American Philosophical Association to congregate as usual between Christmas and the New Year, but to the entire three divisions—Eastern, Western, and Pacific. And the outcome as regards sheer numbers and diversity of representation was surely impressive. From Oregon to Maryland, from Manitoba to Texas the call was answered. While the number of women members attending was perhaps the smallest within memory, the total gathering of men and women at all the sessions was so much larger than had been anticipated that on two occasions adjournment to a larger room was necessary to accommodate the crowds. Not the entire staff of officers of each of the divisions was present, but all were represented, with the highly unusual consequence of two dinners, each culminating in a Presidential address.

In the second place the meeting as planned was unusual in that it was to be the occasion of the second series of Carus lectures, to be delivered by Professor Arthur O. Lovejoy, after an interval of five years since the first series was given by Professor John Dewey. As it happened, a totally unexpected pleasure in connection with these lectures was provided at the close of the first of them. Through the great kindness of Mrs. Carus, each member of the Association was presented by the Open Court Publishing Company with a volume

fresh off its press. This book, *Philosophy Today*, edited by Professor Schaub, contains articles by contemporary writers, twenty-seven of them setting forth current tendencies in philosophy in English, French, and German-speaking countries, with one each for Russia, Scandinavia, and South America. The Association feels itself under a debt of obligation to Mrs. Carus and the Open Court Company for this very generous and acceptable gift.

The third circumstance of place of meeting unquestionably had something to do with the effect of amplitude and dignity that characterized the conference. The setting was Chicago, and something of the sense of largeness belonging to the West went with the fact that the designated place of residence for members was the biggest hotel in America and in the world; and that not one institution of learning but two—Northwestern University and the University of Chicago opened their doors and extended their hospitality. To some who had never before seen the splendid new buildings of Northwestern University, their skyscraper architecture thus applied to academic uses appeared somehow symbolic of the passing of learning from the cloister to the great world. And the ample spaces of Chicago's broad avenues along which we passed to the gathering place in Chicago's own University were reminders of the constantly augmenting throngs that congregate for a share in ancient learning, bringing to old traditions the novelty of modern ways of thinking and of being.

One sad event cast a shadow over this 1927 meeting: the report of Professor Gardiner's death following an automobile accident in Northampton on the evening of the second Presidential address. The occasion of that address had been already solemnized by the knowledge that its author had very nearly not lived to give it. And on the following morning the news came of the death of one to an extraordinary degree endeared to all his colleagues and intimately identified with the Association from its beginnings.

The various business sessions were set for the afternoon of the second day following the second of the Carus lectures. It was at that time that the very good news was reported of a $10,000 Carnegie Foundation grant for publication to be applied to the projected series of compilations from the literature of the various sciences which was originated and afterwards enthusiastically promoted by Professor Walcott. In connection with this grant the question was discussed of the advisability of incorporating the Association to facilitate the handling of these and similar funds which may come our way in the future. The proposed increase of membership fees for the Eastern Division from $1.00 to $2.00 which would make uniform the membership charge for the three divisions would very hap-

pily increase the prospects of a surplus in the treasury which, added to any donations, would make possible a number of worthy projects. Foreign libraries have already requested copies of the *Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress* which was so ably edited by Professor Brightman. Distribution of these Proceedings will entail some expense. Then there are occasionally requests for donations to libraries that have suffered some serious disaster; there are always philosophical periodicals which deserve our support; and, as was suggested by some one, worthy and impecunious Ph.D. candidates might be appropriately assisted in the publication of their dissertations if the Association as a whole or any of its divisions saw fit to appropriate funds for the purpose.

And now as to the papers read at this twenty-seventh meeting of the Association, and the discussion which they elicited.

These papers naturally fall into three groups: the fifteen assorted addresses given at the regular sessions; the two Presidential addresses delivered on Wednesday and Thursday evenings by Professor Hocking and Professor Swenson, respectively; and the three Carus lectures given on Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday afternoons by Professor Lovejoy.

Of the fifteen briefer papers, with the exception of two on ethics and two on esthetics, the preoccupation was predominantly logical and epistemological. Indeed, even one of the ethical papers turned out to be chiefly concerned with theories of knowledge and of objectivity. One member confessed before the end that he had about reached the saturation point of absorption of epistemological discourse; and there may have been others who felt the same way. But it is certain that in many the appetite for epistemology is very nearly insatiable. The predicament of the newspaper reporters was, of course, another matter. They listened doggedly, frantically hoping for some tangible item, some faint connection with the ordinary world of things and people to emerge from the torrent of abstract incomprehensibilities. It was, then, only human that they should have seized hopefully upon the word "scandal" reiterated by Professor Smith, even though all the scandal he referred to was that of unsolved puzzles in logic; or upon the phrase "water, in these prohibition days," even though the reference occurred in a most innocently metaphysical context. Their case seemed not unlike that of the earnest but bewildered lady at a technical lecture in which the title of another technical treatment of a philosophical issue had been quoted, and who at the end panted into the ear of the lecturer: "Oh, I do want to thank you for those beautiful words, 'A plea for soul-substance.'" All the uneasiness of the reporters one could understand, for was not the very same human craving for the con-

crete and the episodic betrayed throughout the serious company by the ready laughter and applause that greeted the lighter aspects of the discourses? The little fables and narratives offered received invariably their full share of attention: Professor Lodge's tale of the rescue ship; Professor Montague's myth of men walking about encased in mirrors; Professor Chamber's delightful anecdote of the Indian wandering in the woods, declaring "no, me not lost, wigwam lost"; Professor Smith's comment regarding the lying habits of Cretans that for the purposes of the famous puzzle which their moral turpitude gave rise to, it must be supposed that they lied invariably, part of the time because they found it desirable, and the rest of the time to keep in practice. With the same appreciation for what offered even a suggestion of comic relief we approved Professor Evans's "league of notions"; Professor Montague's "Niagara Falls of Subjectivism"; Professor Lovejoy's "hypodermal theories of knowledge," and his "cave-man, your only genuine non-bifurcationist until twentieth-century philosophers" and his definition of man as the epistemological animal. This last would probably yield the richest humor to one believing that epistemology is either quite unreal or very vicious. But all brief definitions of our species we find somehow laughable. Professor Lovejoy for his part is an avowed believer in both the naturalness and the propriety of possessing an epistemology—as the definition quoted would indicate: and not, moreover, in just any epistemology, but in a realistic one. For comparison with this, note the comment made to this reviewer in a pause of conversation at dinner that realism is nothing more nor less than a disease. Thus do opinions differ.

The papers offered at the regular sessions were grouped with extreme discrimination. In a number of cases a topic was carried directly from one paper and discussion thereon to the next. But there were also many inter-relations between papers read at different sessions, gradually giving rise to an intricate web of affirmations, denials, re-considerations, and re-echoings. The two papers most completely devoid of connection with any others offered were perhaps the first on the program, "The Pragmatism of Peirce and Hegel" by Professor H. G. Townsend; and that by Professor H. B. Smith: "The Solution of One of Mr. Russell's Paradoxes."

Professor Townsend's contribution was a historical note on the neglected similarity between Peirce and Hegel—this in spite of the admitted absence of indication of indebtedness to Hegel in the work of Peirce, who was ignorant of the earlier logician and despised him. So closely parallel are, however, the two logics, according to Professor Townsend—and Royce had noted the similarity before him—that the element of voluntarism in Peirce may be said to constitute the one essential difference between them.

Professor Smith's topic was the famous Epimenides situation; and his purpose was to show that the scholastics were wrong in their view—also later put forward by Bertrand Russell in his *Theory of Types*—that you can't substitute one of the possible values of a proposition for the proposition itself. The trouble with the rule is that it eliminates more than one wants to have eliminated. It would allow for such a statement as: All propositions are either true or false (except this proposition); which would be meaningless. The paper involved considerable mathematical symbolism and intricate conversions of propositions. A somewhat awestruck silence following the presentation of it was broken by Professors Montague and Farber, who voiced some differences of opinion, and to whom Professor Smith replied that it seemed to him, to be sure, no scandal for a proposition to *imply* its own falsity, whereas it would be scandalous for it to be *equivalent* to its own falsity.

The two papers dealing with ethical issues were those by Professors D. Luther Evans and A. P. Brogan.

The point of departure for Professor Evans was the connection that he found between ethics and epistemology in the moral importance of a denial of relativism. Taking for his title "Current Epistemology and Contemporary Ethics" he charged pragmatism and realism with making a common war on idealism although it actually shared important doctrines with each of them. Each had its own way of providing objectivity for moral distinctions, pragmatism by locating values in the environment, realism by recognizing a subsistential basis for ethical values. Professor Sharp, in replying to these assertions, observed that objectivity could be equally well achieved by observing the two criteria of consistency and completeness in the making of moral judgments.

Professor Brogan spoke on "Hedonism and Comparative Values." The orthodox hedonism in terms of good and bad he declared to be true, but inadequate—pointing out its failure to take into account either distribution of pleasure or its duration as distinguished from its intensity. The problem of hedonism, therefore, should be formulated in new ways, and the concepts of better and worse in place of good and bad ought at least to be tried out. Betterness hedonism on examination appears, however, to be false in fact. The argument proved to be stimulating to discussion, eliciting comments from Professors Wilde, Urban, Brightman, and Lodge.

Between Professor Conger's paper, "An Hypothesis of Realms" and that given by Professor Dewey on "Social as Category" there appeared to this reviewer to obtain some interesting connections.

Professor Conger, taking as his opening theme a quotation from Lloyd Morgan to the effect that life stands to matter as mind stands

to life, announced the intention of first making clear in what sense these three sorts of realities constitute realms; and then of extending the concept of *realm* to other regions of reality—three, to be precise—lying below the level of matter. A realm, he maintained, is made up of monads, and is distinguished by the peculiarities of: relative individuation; interactions of its parts; repeated production or reproduction; and segregation. A cumulative coördination of matter gives life; and a cumulative coördination of matter and life gives mind. The theory then was advanced that starting with logical entities and passing upward to number, and on to geometrical entities, we come next to matter, then life, and finally mind—six realms each bearing the same relation to the preceding that the succeeding bears to it, and each realm emerging out of what lies below it. In reply to the objection raised later by Professor Montague that the discrepancy between the subsistent and the existent would seem to preclude a passage from the third to the fourth realm in any way comparable to the other transitions, Professor Conger asserted that increasing knowledge should make possible the filling in of details and tend to close all gaps.

Now Professor Dewey and Professor Conger may not have felt in agreement with regard to their respective theses; none the less, it may not have been a mere fancied relation that one found between their two sets of contentions. The test of this would be whether an interchange of the terms of discourse which they severally employed could be made without doing outrage to the idea of either. Under this manipulation Professor Conger's thesis would become: the logical, numerical, geometrical, material, vital, and mental are fundamental categories no one of which is adequately analyzable into terms of the preceding; and Professor Dewey's would read: the social is a realm emergent from the material, vital, and mental lying below it, to which it is not reducible, but which are all present within it. Professor Dewey's own words appear to be in the spirit of this translation. "The social," he observed, "incorporates the physical, taking it up into association of a richer sort." Again, he declared that social science may be interpreted as including all that is included in natural science. Commenting on the dispute as to whether social phenomena are to be described in material, organic, or psychical terms, he asserted that it was apparently not realized that the social is unique and not to be reduced to other categories. His provocative opening declaration was that the question whether we should start with the complex or with the simple is the fundamental question of philosophy, going deeper than any distinction of reality and appearance; and that according to whether or not the category of social was admitted one would begin with the rich and compli-

cated; or the simpler. The social is to be recognized as only one type of association, but the most significant type, lending meaning to the categories of physical, vital, and mental, these being not unreal outside the realm of the social, but merely relatively insignificant. Professor Dewey concluded with the observation that the fallacy of the whole empirical British school had been that it neglected relations, being committed to a nominalistic particularism; and that in modern times Russell, Moore, and Santayana had been guilty of the same fallacy.

Two further papers which seemed to have connections with the pair just discussed were those by Professor George A. Wilson and Professor Marvin Farber. That by Professor Farber, "Theses Concerning the Foundations of Logic," was largely concerned with the analysis of logic into domains; thus doing for the sphere of the abstract what Professor Conger did for all levels of reality—logical and existential— and what Professor Dewey did for the realm of living beings in their social environment. Professor Farber was particularly interested in the question of the applicability, to the various domains, of the principle of excluded middle. As to the principle of contradiction, the conceivable universe, he declared, may contain contradiction, but it is the business of logic to exclude it. For logic, indeed, the first pronouncement is: In the beginning was exclusion. With the meaningless, philosophy has nothing to do—and in this connection he quoted the saying of William James that philosophy should consider only the propositions that are at least false.

A not too remote connection with Professor Dewey's thesis may be made out for the contentions of Professor George A. Wilson in his "Search for the Concrete." More specifically, Professor Wilson's sense that concrete reality is to be looked for in persons rather than in anything simpler seemed related to Professor Dewey's feeling that beings in their complex social environment are an ultimate reality not susceptible of resolution into the simpler elements of any lower order of existence. Professor Wilson declared that change and creativeness being both undeniably real, any interpretation of things in terms of a static absolute such as that of the modern idealists is totally inadequate; while on the other hand any such creativeness as the merely physical world manifests is of a mechanical nature: persons alone are creative in a genuine sense.

One of the most brilliant of the papers offered was that by Professor W. Curtis Swabey on "The Regulative Idea of a Cosmos." It opened with the observation that whereas there appeared to be prevalent the notion that there is only one kind of logic—the deductive, Aristotelian, or mathematical variety—in reality there is ac-

tually very extensively practiced a logic of probability: and that this is the kind employed in the greater part of scientific procedure. Science for the most part achieves no more than probabilities; the "laws of nature" being "weighted with existential import" are at best only problematic or hypothetical. In the formulation of such laws—such as the principle of evolution or the principles of Copernican astronomy—it is the "regulative idea of a cosmos" that guides the thinker. Now the three presuppositions of thought are:

1. The law of consistency,
2. The law of the uniformity of nature,
3. The principle of the harmony of the world: that nature is essentially simple. This is the law of parsimony—the principle that there will be the greatest possible effects by the least possible means. The doctrine of teleology, of which Kant admitted a cosmic as well as a physiological variety, is merely a case of the doctrine of least possible means. In actual practice we regard that principle which introduces the most harmony and order as the most probable.

In reply to questions from Professor Ducasse and others, Professor Swabey affirmed the variation on this: that the more *inclusive* hypothesis is the more probably true; and that simplicity and probability do not mean the same thing. The *simplest* proposition is the one giving the maximum of unity in variety; the more *probable* is the more inclusive.

Professor Chambers' paper was another which introduced the issue of probability *vs.* certainty, his title being "The Search for Certainty." It was another plea for a "league of notions." The analytic method of realism he advocated, but not as the sole method of attaining certainty. Realists have established that what is experienced *is,* but it is not enough to have items of reality. We want their togetherness, and this is furnished by the idealistic criterion of coherence and the ideal of a progressively more comprehensive experience.

Professor McGilvary in reply maintained that passage from certainty to mere probability is a progress; as Russell had it, the purpose of education is to unsettle. Tentativeness of attitude is a desirable condition, and not one to be deplored. In the same tenor Professor Loewenberg suggested that an elastic ultimate is what we want. To this Professor Chambers agreed, adding that the only sceptic to be feared is the one who *knows.*

Professor Loewenberg's own paper on "The Paradox of Judgment" proved to be one of the most successful in calling forth varied and spirited discussion. It opened with the assertion that judgment is four-fold: an act of an individual mind, a sentence having a definite form, an assertion of a state of knowledge, and a de-

scription of reality, thus necessitating a psychological, logical, epistemological, and metaphysical approach to its analysis. The main issue of the paper was a consideration of the difficulties involved in maintaining on the one hand, as is usually done, that judgment *refers* to something, and on the other that it *describes* something. The purely epistemological treatment of judgment can disregard the existential issue; the metaphysical treatment reintroduces this issue and we are compelled to admit that judgment is always about the real. The question then becomes whether the real is the initial occasion or the final result of judgment. If it is the former, then it defies description; if the latter then there is nothing objective for the judgment to refer to. The difficulty is that prior to judgment there is no distinction of real and unreal: *everything* is real. But the distinction between reality and unreality is necessary for an existential theory of judgment. The cure for the difficulty, Professor Loewenberg suggested, is twofold: to clear up the confusion and ambiguity of the use of the term "real"; and to realize that the judgment both refers and describes. The "referred real is the *subject* of characterization; the described real is the characterized *object.*"

In the ensuing discussion interesting points of view were introduced by Professors Lodge, Ducasse, Townsend, Lovejoy, and Blanchard.

The two papers offered on problems of esthetics were, most appropriately, productive of esthetic appreciation as well as of speculative interest: they were themselves beautiful—that by Professor Ducasse with the cold, clear beauty of a finely articulated analysis; that by Professor Ames with the rich warm beauty of an imaginative vision.

Professor Ames's subject was "Art and Life." The esthetic, he maintained, is an element in all experience; no object is unsusceptible of esthetic valuation, and all men, in so far as they have wishes, can have the sense of beauty. Life and art he characterized repeatedly in parallel terms. Neither the one nor the other is mere form without emotion, nor mere emotion without form. All life is caught up in art, and by one half of each we are broken-hearted, and by the other half mended. The secret of each is consummation —indeed the very form and substance of art is harmony emerging from discord, unity emerging from variety. All esthetic experience arises in a problematic situation, giving rise to a contemplative attitude, and each of the arts can be analyzed in terms of the two aspects: of unsettling and harmonizing. The greatness of art is measured by the degree to which it ministers to the life of the en-

tire individual. Literature, then, is the highest, because it ministers not only to the body, but also to the spirit.

Professor Parker, in his reply to the paper, agreed with the substance of it, objecting only that while correctly asserting that art produced an esthetic consummation, the paper did not offer any real explanation of how this miraculous effect came about or why we are willing to accept the substitution.

Professor Ducasse's paper bore the challenging title "What Has Beauty to do with Art?"; his brief answer to his own question was: it has nothing to do with it, as witness the cases of ugly art. By ugly art, moreover, he meant not art treating of material in itself ugly, but art that in its final effect is ugly. No instances of ugly art were offered and the first line of attack might have been entrenched exactly there. *Is* there any genuine art which is ugly? If a production is ugly is it art? Professor Ducasse's contention was startling, but, of course, extremely wholesome for stirring us out of that dogmatic slumber into which we so easily pass in regions esthetic no less than in regions epistemological. We were not, of course, told that art may not sometimes be beautiful. When the feeling it arouses is pleasant it is precisely the beautiful that is experienced. But there may also be unpleasant feelings, the work of art being the "critically controlled objectified expression" of the artist's feelings, whatever they may be, beauty and ugliness arising when the result of this objectification is contemplated by an observer. Beauty and ugliness are the joint function, then, of two factors: the nature of the object and the nature of the beholder. They are objective in that they are predicable of objects, not of feelings; subjective inasmuch as they involve feelings. Professor Ducasse was in agreement with Professor Ames in feeling that there is no object, beautiful or ugly, significant or trivial, abstract or concrete, artificial or natural, but may be esthetically contemplated.

Professors Hocking, Dewey, Boynton, and Shearer took part in the subsequent discussion.

The last two papers on the third day's program preceding the delivery of the last Carus lecture, were, rather appropriately, though not apparently by deliberate intent, intimately related in their preoccupations with that lecture.

Professor Sterling Lamprecht treated of "Sense Qualities and Material Things," and Professor Arthur Murphy dealt with the question, "What is an Event?"

The first source of interest in Professor Lamprecht's argument was that it represented the point of view which Professor Lovejoy had been analyzing—the point of view of objective relativism as opposed to dualistic realism. Professor Lamprecht gave an ex-

tremely interesting presentation of this attitude which he declared bears the same relation to Darwin that dualism bears to Newton, and according to which the characters of things are due to their relationships to other things. In other words, the theory attempts to transcend the distinction of material substance and sensory qualities, thus avoiding the difficulty of finding what relation they bear to one another by treating both qualities and substantiality as *characters* that things have. An event is a spatio-temporal unity; the course of nature is fluid, rich, manifold, continuous, and inclusive; terms are discrete and exclusive. We do not start with sensory qualities, we extract them from complex situations. Dualism is the unavoidable solution only if we postulate self-contained realities.

The attitude thus depicted Professor Lovejoy afterwards characterized as pre-reflective realism. He at the same time lodged a complaint against monists for their persistent attribution to dualists of the doctrine of complete externality of all relations—and even of the denial of relations altogether.

Professor Murphy's paper was a different kind of defense of concreteness; and it was furthermore related to Professor Lovejoy's third lecture by involving likewise an attack upon doctrines of Professor Whitehead. Professor Murphy made the point that whereas Whitehead had protested against "misplaced concreteness," he was himself guilty of the fallacy in seizing upon the spatio-temporal aspect of events and in the theory of extensive abstraction, making them do duty for the events themselves. The true meaning of event is merely the occurrence of what occurs. Events as such have no characters though there are characters of objects *as* occurring. In a word, the concrete event is not to be accounted for in terms of any mere aspects of what occurs. The spatio-temporal element is no more real than other elements. The geometry of events is all geometry and no events. The denial of objects as such has improperly led to the assertion, not of the occurrence of objects, but just occurrence.

Regarding the other two groups of addresses it is not in order to say very much here. The two Presidential addresses will be published in full; and the Carus lectures are to be not only reviewed at greater length than is here possible and by a more competent critic; but also printed in a much amplified form as a volume. But these five special addresses can not be passed over entirely without some slight indication of their remarkable quality.

Professor Hocking's paper: "What Does Philosophy Say?" does, to be sure, almost completely elude the brief reviewer. To such a high degree did it achieve the double philosophic and esthetic ideal of harmony of form and content—giving expression in eloquent lan-

guage to a ripe wisdom of outlook upon thought and life—that its substance could not really be communicated except in its original investiture. While, incidentally, Professor Hocking deplored the philosophy that can be characterized only as beautiful and not also as contributory to an enrichment of experience, his own utterances would have to be characterized by reference to the category of that sort of beauty which mediates the life-enhancement which he himself was pleading for.

Professor Swenson's offering was an impassioned appeal to the philosopher to be humble and realize that he is after all a man—even as all men, and not an elect few only, may discover that they are in reality philosophers. In his pointing of the antithesis of objective uncertainty and human faith one was reminded of similarities and lack of similarities to that earlier contrast of Santayana's between scepticism and animal faith. But all such comments are superficial and inadequate. The content and delivery of the address was charged with a quality of sincerity and profound feeling which it is quite impossible to indicate.

The title of the Carus lectures was in full: "A Critical Examination of the Contemporary Revolt against Dualism"; and the material as given was divided into three parts: Lecture I, The First Phase; Lecture II, Objective Relativism, (1) Universal Respectivity and Multiple Inherence; Lecture III, Objective Relativism, (2) The Denial of Simple Location.

By dualism Professor Lovejoy meant both the epistemological and psycho-physical varieties, and he chose to treat of the twofold revolt as constituting one of the most sustained and resourceful philosophical enterprises of the present time—a revolt of the twentieth century against the seventeenth.

The lectures included a masterly survey of the genesis and nature of the "natural realism" of man, including an enumeration of the five fundamental assumptions that function as the basic postulates of such a realism, *viz:*

1. Assumption of spatio-externality of objects.
2. Assumption of their occurrence in times other than the present moment.
3. Assumption of their accessibility to other minds.
4. Assumption of their accessibility to knowledge as they are in themselves.
5. Assumption of other minds to know them.

It was stated that the considerations which in the past had produced realism would inevitably again produce it even should Descartes and all his reflections vanish utterly out of man's memory. Professor

Lovejoy paid particular tribute to the natural processes of thought of primitive man and to the importance for philosophy of various discoveries incorporated in the growing body of the sciences. A complete history of philosophy, he observed, should give due regard to certain pre-historic discoveries and to many discoveries commonly regarded as the concern of the physicist rather than of the philosopher.

The third lecture consisted largely of a detailed analysis and criticism of Professor Whitehead as one of the most significant recent protestors against the bifurcation of nature. This entailed a consideration of the denial of simple location.

In hastily summarized conclusion, setting forth convictions to be substantiated later by lengthy argument, Professor Lovejoy asserted that neither reality nor knowledge are all of a piece, the world having something added to it when mind appeared, and knowledge being not infallible. Dualism corrects a tendency to over-simplification in philosophy.

There followed a deluge of queries and comments from the floor. Professor Lovejoy was variously asked what he meant by mind, and by cognition; why he was not a pluralist rather than a dualist; how he expected to protect himself against subjectivism; and why relativity to bodily states necessarily constituted relativity to mind. The contestants furthermore took to questioning and answering each other, until, the hour growing late and the audience beginning to dwindle, President Hocking judiciously remarked that there were some questions which ought to echo through the ages unanswered. Thus came to a close the twenty-seventh meeting of the American Philosophical Association.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Mental Hygiene. DANIEL W. LARUE. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1927. x + 443 pp.

Professor LaRue's interest in the educational aspects of mental hygiene has been well known since his early cooperation with Yerkes in the suggestive *Outline for the Study of the Self.* The present volume of 443 pages seeks to provide a textbook in the subject for teachers and pupils who come to it with little or no previous psychological knowledge.

Part I, dealing with "Forces that Determine Personality," raises the general problems of mental health and disease, emphasizing that both these may, within limits, be learned and practiced. Part II considers the inheritance and development of personality traits and

the genesis of the self. Brief statements are given of the traditional pictures of mental disturbance, and their causes, recognition, and treatment are briefly indicated. Part III presents nine chapters on "The Mental Hygiene of Adult Life," touching on such topics as sleep, work, recreation, confidence, control, sex, religion, social adjustment. Part IV gives eleven chapters, somewhat unrelated, on the "Mental Hygiene of Childhood and Adolescence," with special reference to the school and the treatment of youth's difficulties by teachers.

With each chapter are provided class exercises, provocative questions, topics for further study and for collateral investigation, with a brief bibliography. The text is concretely written, with as animated a style as the subject seems to permit, and relies largely on simple analogies rather than adequate description or explanation. The discussion is slow in getting under way, since a considerable amount of elementary psychology must be introduced before the hygiene of the "phreno-mens" can be presented. The author's style and the free use of figures of speech are probably well designed for readers for whom such an introductory text is expressly intended.

The book is not free from statements that offend the psychological reader, such as that "great men have, in general, large noses," or "one who is self-centered, in the sense of having his self centers overdeveloped, has a most unfortunate deformity of the brain." In fact, the whole "brain center," "neurogram" and "stream of transmission" scheme, as developed for the aid of the student's comprehension, is dubiously credulous, naïve, over-simplified, and overworked.

The author nowhere clearly informs the student just what is meant by mind. The term is often used as the equivalent of consciousness, but the practice is not adhered to and the hygiene advocated applies for the most part to something other than the treatment of consciousness. The suggestion that the laws of learning apply to the development of mental abnormality, ought really to be elaborated beyond the hints here afforded.

However, since the very existence of a body of principles of mental hygiene adequate to fill 440 pages is problematic, and since the need for such principles is keenly felt in the schools, it is a great gain to have such an attempt made, by a teacher, for teachers and students, rather than by the advocate of a cult. When used as the author intends, LaRue's volume is bound to stimulate genuine interest in mental health, at an early age, and to point the way toward useful types of knowledge and of practice.

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JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. Vol. XXXVII, 1. Medieval and Modern Philosophy: *H. C. Longwell.* Methodology and Psychology: *H. C. Sanborn.* The Nature of Philosophical Impartiality: *W. S. Gamertsfelder.* That Elusive Doctrine of Essence: *Durant Drake.* Consciousness, the Unconscious, and Mysticism: *J. S. Moore, Knight Dunlap.*

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. LIII Année, Nos. 1 et 2. L'expérience morale selon Rauh: *L. Brunschvicg.* Le théorie psychologique de la forme: *E. Rignano.* Esquisse d'une théorie intuitiviste de la connaisance: *N. Lossky.* Signification spirituelle du principe d'économie: *V. Jankelevitch.* Esthétique: *Ch. Lalo.*

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NOTES AND NEWS

The program of lectures for 1928 given by the Philosophical Union of the University of California at Berkeley, under the title, "The Problem of Truth," is as follows:

January 20, 1928. "The Problem of Truth," Prof. J. H. Muirhead.

February 3, 1928. "Truth by Continuity," Prof. S. C. Pepper.

February 17, 1928. "Aesthetic and Experimental Truth," Prof. D. S. Mackey.

March 2, 1928. "Practice as the Test of Truth," Prof. W. R. Dennes.

March 16, 1928. "The Problem of Error," Dr. P. Marhenke.

March 30, 1928. "Truth, Discourse and Reality," Prof. G. P. Adams.

April 13, 1928. "The Fourfold Root of Truth," Prof. J. Loewenberg.

April 27, 1928. "Truth Subsistential and Existential," Prof. W. P. Montague.

Students of philosophy or other interested in serious discussion of philosophical problems are invited to become members of the Union.

We have been asked to make known through Notes and News the fact that an extremely limited edition of Benjamin Rand's "Correspondence of John Locke and Edward Clarke" has been printed, and that the type has been distributed. Those wishing to own copies are urged therefore to obtain them as soon as possible, since the edition will not long be available.